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Abstract
A substantial literature exists on the impact of pension schemes,
both public and private, on the level of household saving. Yet there
is no clear consensus on the impact of pensions on private saving. In this
paper we show how beliefs about this displacement effect aremodified by
prior beliefs both about variables which n.ght be relevant in an equation
for private savings and about the magnitude of the displacement effect.
Using data for 8,279 Canadian households, and estimates of pension wealth
(both private and social security) which we construct for each household
in the sample, the estimated displacement effects are found to be relatively
robust with respect to both types of prior belief.
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1. Introduction
There is, by now, a substantial literature on the impact of pension
schemes, both public and private, on the level of household savings.'
Feldstein's (1974) time—series study of the impact of social security wealth
in the US spawned numerous empirical studies using both time—series and cross—
section data. Yet there is no clear consensus on the impact of pensions
on private saving. In part, this results from the fact that theory does not
yield unambiguous predictions about the response of household savings to the
existence of pension wealth. At least four possible influences may be identified:
(a) If pension wealth is seen as a substitute for private
accumulation there will be a displacement of the latter when the former is
introduced or Increased. In the limit, If other assets were perfect
substitutes for pension wealth, the offset would be tone_for_oneU, an
implied displacement of unity.
(b) There may be an induced retirement effect which would tend to raise
household savings in order to finance consumption over a longer period of
retirement (Feldstein 1974).
(c) Concern about future generations, upon whom the cost of meeting the
pension commitment of unfunded schemes falls, may result in additional
private savings for higher bequests in order to offset the increased tax
burden. (Barro 1974, 1978). Alternatively, unfunded schemes may result
in intergenerational transfers with both a wealth and a substitution effect.
Cd) Imperfections in the capital market may undermine the relevance of—2—
the life—cycle model, at least to the behaviour of a minority of households
(Diamond and Hausman 1982, King and Dicks—Mireaux 1982).
These ambiguities in the theoretical effects of pensions on private
saving mean that we must turn to empirical evidence. It is clear, however,
that the interpretation of existing evidence suffers from two defects.
First, the absence of clear cut theoretical predictions does not mean
that we examine and interpret the evidence free from the influence of prior
beliefs. Theoretical introspection rarely leads to a completely diffuse
prior. But since prior beliefs differ, we need to understand how important
any given set of empirical results is for a range of priors, and it is useful
to summarise the evidence in terms of a mapping from prior to posterior
beliefs. Secondly, there is the suspicion that reported results may (for
a variety of reasons which include the priors of referees and journal editors
as well as space constraints) be reported selectively and may not be robust
to minor changes in the specification of the model.In this paper we present
some evidence on the displacement effect of pension wealth on private net
worth, in the light of these two concerns, using data for 8,279 Canadian
households.
We estimate the displacement effects for two types of pension, social
security and private pension wealth, and this natural two—dimensional aspect
allows us to present a geometric interpretation of the results. This
diagrammatic representation is useful in any problem in which we are concerned
mainly with the estimates of a pair of parameters, and may be of more
general interest than the present context.—3—
The basic model and our research strategy are set out in section 2
and the data employed in this study are described in section 3. The main
results are presented in section 4. In section 5 we consider the effect
of alternative estimates of pension wealth for these results. Our conclusions
are summarised in section 6.We should be clear from the outset that we
are not concerned here with the implications of social security for the total
level of savings and investment because these depend upon the extent to which
social security is funded.2
2. The Basic Model
We shall estimate a model for the behaviour of household net worth
over the life cycle and its dependence, if any, on pension wealth.There
are several strategies upon which such an investigation could be based.
First, we could pursue an ad hoc approach of estimating alternative sped-.
fications and report the "best results" according to some criterion such as
goodness of fit.This raises the problem of selective reporting. Secondly,
we could estimate a very general model (which, in practice, would mean
including a large number of ecplanatory variables) and use various statistical
criteria to reduce the model by gradually eliminating some of the independent
variables until a parsimonious representation is achieved. We call this a
"contracting search". But, as with ad hoc regression strategies, the process
of model selection entailed by a contracting search does not, in general,
lead to inference under classical statistical theory.3Thirdly, we could
construct the full Bayesian mapping from a given set of prior beliefs into
a posterior distribution for the parameters of the model.—4—
Although the Bayesian approach probably corresponds more closely to
the way in which we absorb the results of empirical studies, it gives no
feel for the sensitivity of the posterior distribution to changes in the
prior. This is unfortunate because it is implausible to suppose that the
consumers of the output of a research project would all agree on a precise
specification for the prior.A more flexible approach is required. One
of the contributions of Learner (1978) is to show that we can say a good
deal about the posterior distribution even though the prior distribution
is not fully specified. Our research strategy is to examine the sensitivity
of the displacement effects of pension wealth to changes in the type and
amount of prior information we are willing to specifly.These range from
beliefs about which are the relevant explanatory variables to prior beliefs
about the magnitude of the displacement effects. The posterior estimates
of the displacement effects depend upon both the prior and the information
in our data set, and we shall try to disentangle the relative contributions
of the two for our conclusions about the impact of pension wealth on household
net worth.
The framework for our analysis is the life—cycle model of household
consumption (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954, Modigliani and Ando 1957). For
a cross—section of households, the life—cycle model implies a nonlinear
relatio'nship between the ratio of wealth to permanent income and age.
Permanent income is defined here as normal annual earnings. We condition on
this variable because of the correlation between age and the other determinants
of potential net worth, such as education and the differences in the lifetime
prospects of differentcohorts.4The life—cycle model itself places few—5—
a priori constraints on the function describing the age profile of household
net worth, apart from a presumption of a "hump-shaped" pattern, once we
allow for uncertainty about length of life, future earnings and rates of
return.5 There is, therefore, a good deal of latitude in the specification
of the functional form to be estimated, and there are no convincing a priori
grounds for choosing among alternative approximations to the true relation-
ship. If we assume that households experience a period of retirement during
which they expect to receive little or no labour income, then formost
plausible earnings profiles we would expect the ratio of net worth (excluding
the present value of future earnings) to permanent income to first increase
with age and then to decline after retirement. Support for this stylised
view is given by Figure 1. This shows the average ratio of wealth to
permanent income for each 5—year age group over the life cycle for our sample
of households. Wealth is defined as the value of non—human assets plus the
present value of pension wealth.The construction of variables for pension
wealth and permanent income, and details of the sample, are described in
Section 3 below. Two profiles are shown in Figure 1 corresponding to total
net worth (TW) and net worth excluding the value of equity in owner—occupied
housing (TW'), respectively. A clear life—cycle pattern can be observed.6
To approximate the true age profile of wealth holdings, we shall use
the nonlinear piecewise function employed in our earlier study (King and
Dicks—Mireaux 1982) which consists of six pieces corresponding to pre—determined
age ranges. It is then possible to estimate the model by the following linear
regression—6—
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TW.is the total net worth of household i
1
Y. is the perrnar.ent income of household I
v., j =1...7,are age variables for the head of household i which
are defined in Appendix 1. One of the variables (corresponding to the
age range 60—75) is quadratic in age so that the data may determine
whether or not there is a maximum for the level of household net worth.
The value of a0 is the natural logarithm of the ratio of wealth to
permanent income at age 15; which is approximately the lowest age at which
working life could begin. The values of a1 to a7 measure the average annual
rates of accumulation of wealth in the various age ranges.
Equation (1) relates to total net worth including both social security
and private pension wealth.We shall assume, however, that pension wealth
is an exogenous variable beyond the control of an individual household.
Although this is true of social security wealth, it maybepossible to change
the level of private pension wealth by choosing an occupation which offers an
appropriate retirement compensation package.We shall ignore this possible
source of endogeneity and take net worth excluding pension wealth as the
dependent variable. Pension wealth becomes an explanatory variable thus
enabling us to estimate displacement effects.Since pension wealth is an
imperfect substitute for other forms of wealth, we assume that total wealth
maybeexpressed in terms of net worth excluding pension wealth (W), social—7—
security wealth (SW) and private pension wealth (PW) by a loglinear
approxirnat ion.
in =in[] + in {-J + a2 D in [} (2)
where D =1if the household is eligible for a private pension plan, zero




a2D in []+u. (3)
The setThf true explanatory variables is likely to be larger than those
contained in equation (3). Unless these are orthogonal to pension wealth,
their inclusion or exclusion will affect the estimates of the displacement
effect. We divide these additional variables into two types. The first
comprises variables that we would wish to include in the basic specification
on a priori grounds. In this category we include permanent income (to test
for homotheticity) and the number of persons in the household with life
insurance coverage (because the data on net worth exclude the value of insur-
ance policies).The second consists of variables which are less obvious
candidates as explanatory variables, but which we are unwilling to exclude on
a priori grounds. Since we regard (3) as a linearisation of the true
relationship, we include in the second category higher order age terms, as
well as regional and area dummies, the number of adults in the household,
the number of persons in the household who are unemployed, and a farm family—8—
dummy.7The full list of variables in both categories is shown in Appendix 2.
Although the distinction between the two categories is not clearcut, it
represents our prior view about which are likely to be the relevant explanatory
variables, and corresponds to Learner's (1978) distinction between "focus" and
"doubtful" variables. In section 4 we shall examine the robustness of the
estimated displacement effects to alternative specifications of equation (3).
The second set of prior beliefs we shall examine concerns priors about the
actual magnitudes of the displacement effects. The interpretation of
published results is likely to be influenced by prior beliefs. Such priors
may originate from a distillation of previous empirical evidence or from a
theoretical model. To examine formally the sensitivity of conclusions to
prior beliefs we consider two priors namely (a) a zero displacement effect
for both social security and private pension wealth, and (b) a displacement
effect of unity (a one—for—one effect) for both types of pension wealth.8
This will allow us to examine the sensitivity of posterior beliefs about the
displacement effect to various degrees of belief in the prior. How confident,
for example, would we have to be in either of these priors not to modify
significantly our beliefs about the impact of pension wealth on household
savings?
The choice of the two priors is a deliberate attempt to set up "straw
men" that encompass the full range of viewpoints which have been expressed
about the size of the displacement effects. Empirical studies have produced
differing estimates of the effect of pension wealth on savings. Cross—section
studies in the U.S. by Kotlikoff (1979), Feldstein and Pellechio (1979)—9—
and Feldstein (1980) found this to be greater than 0.5. In contrast,
magnitudes of less than 0.5 have been found by Nunnell (1976) and Diamond and
Hausman (1982); in the former study this was true also for private pensions.
In one of the few studies using Canadian data, Boyle and Murray (1979) using
aggregate time—series data found no significant impact of social security
on savings.







For the prior of zero displacement,c1 andtherefore take values of
zero.Imposing unitary displacement effects, computed at sample means
at age 65, gives a prior for and a2 equal to minus the reciprocal
of the mean net worth to pension wealth ratio for the sample of all 65 year
olds and those eligible for a private pension respectively.
In section 4, we examine the posterior distributions of the displacement
effects corresponding to the three Sets of priors described above, namely
a prior about which are the relevant explanatory variables, a prior of zero
for the displacement effects, and a prior for the displacement of unity at
age65.—10—
3.The Data
The data used in this study refer to 8,279 Canadian families in 1977,
and are taken from the Statistics Canada micro—data tape "Income (1976),
Assets and Debts (1977) of Economic Families and Unattached Individuals"
whichcontains data collected as a supplement to the 1977 Survey of Consumer
Finances.9 A household is defined as a group sharing a common dwelling and
related by blood or marriage. The data on net worth refer to market values
in May 1977 and the income data to the calendar year 1976. The survey data on
net worth exclude pension wealth (which we discuss below), consumer durables
other than cars, equity in life insurance policies and other "assets" such
as the expected value of future inheritances and support from relatives or
children.
There are 12,734 households in the data base. This number was reduced
to 8,279 in two stages.First, we excluded all households headed by a
woman. A substantial fraction of such households were headed by elderly
women, probablywidows, for whom permanent income is determined primarily
bythe life—time earnings of the deceased husband on which no information
was available. Permanent income was computed as a minimum—variance estimate
of normal age—adjusted annual earnings using the method proposed in King
and Dicks—Mireaux (1982) to which the reader is referred for further details.
This exclusion reduced the number of households to 10,118.10 At the second
stage a further 1,839 households with net worth less than $2,500 were excluded
thus bringing the sample used in estimation down to 8,279. The reason for
this exclusion is that in our earlier study (King and Dicks—Mireaux 1982) we
found evidence of different types of savings behaviour among different groups—11—
of the population, and the truncation adopted here corresponds to that of the
earlier paper. To correct for the truncation bias thus induced we used the
two—stage procedure suggested by Heckman (1976, 1979) which involved
estimating a probit model for low wealth—holdings (less than $2,500) and
including the inverse of the Mills' ratio as an additional explanatory
variable in the second stage regression for the ratio of net worth to
permanent income. The results for the probit model are reported in our earlier
paper (op. cit., Table4).
The most important component of wealth for which we do not have direct
observations is the value of the right to future private pensions and old
age social security payments. Social security wealth is defined as that accruing
from the public retirement income system, and comes from five sources:
Old Age Security (OAS), the Guaranteed Income Supplement (CIS), the Spouses'
Allowance (SPA), and the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans (CQPP). The OAS
provides flat—rate benefits which are taxable, and were equal to $1,634.34 in
1976 to those aged 65 and over. Eligibility for GIS is based on receipt of
OAS, and those who have no income other than OAS receive the maximum benefit
of $1,146.30 and $2,035.80 (in 1976), for single and two—pensioner families
respectively. The SPA is payable to a pensioners' spouse, provided he or she
is 60—64 years old and would, except for age, qualify for OAS and the GIS at
the two—pensioner family rate. Both these benefits are reduced, at different
rates, if income is received from sources other than OAS. These benefits
have been fully indexed to increases in the consumer price index (CPI) since
1972, and are all financed from general tax revenue.—12—
The Canada and Quebec pension plans, which are virtually identical
with automatic transferability of benefit credits, were established in 1965
and cover almost the entire labour force. Both plans are contributory and
earnings—related. Contributions are paid by individuals aged 18 to 70 years
and not receiving plan benefits, at a rate of 3.6% shared equally by employers
and employees and paid in full by the self—employed, on earnings between a
lower and upper bound.Both plans provide three types of benefits:
retirement pensions, survivors' benefits, and disability benefits. Since
1976 the eligible age for receipt of retirement benefits has been sixty—five.
The benefit level is calculated as 25% of adjusted career average earnings
(ACAE), multiplied bythe average value of the yearly maximum pensionable
earnings(YMPE) in the final three working years. The ACAE is the mean
value of the ratio (with a maximum value of one) of earnings to YNPEin
the best 85% of earning years. The intent of the system appears to be to
index the YMPE to the average wage and salary index, although in practice
it has on occasion failed to achieve this. Benefit payments are indexed
to the CPI. Survivors' benefits include death benefits, surviving spouses'
pensions, disabled widowers' pensions, and orphan benefits.The surviving
spouse's pension, (the one of most concern to us), is 60% of that which would
have been paid to the deceased contributor if the spouse is 65 years old or
older, plus a flat—rate component if aged 45 to 65. For those of age less
than 45 the pension level is determined by age, the number of dependent
children, and disability.
The recent nature of the plan, and the transitional arrangements used
to introduce it, has added a further source of variation in the value of—13—
pension rights across individuals. Those persons aged 55 and less in 1966
were to be eligible for full pensions at age 65; in effect the closer an
individual was to age 55 in 1966 the greater the "bonus" or net benefit
received. Those of age 56 or more, contributing for less than ten years
would receive a pro rated pension.
Tocalculate the benefit level of CQPP the eligibility rules described
above were applied to individual age—earnings profiles.The profiles are
those estimated for the purpose of constructing our measure of permanent
income. The benefit accruing in each year of retirement was multiplied by
the individual's probability of surviving until that year. To convert these
survival—adjusted benefits into a present value the nominal discount rate
was chosen to be equal to the rate of change of the wage and salary index.
In other words the real discount rate was assumed to be equal to the rate
of productivity growth. The age—earnings profile and so also the estimated
benefit levels are in 1976 dollars.Therefore, because the yearly maximum
pensionable earnings are effectively indexed to the nominal discount rate,
for years up to retirement, a discount factor of one was applied to the
survival—adjusted benefits.With benefit payments indexed to the CPI,
for post—retirement years we use the real discount rate set at 2.5%.For
wives allowance was made for non—participation in the labour force at various
stages of the life cycle by adjusting the level of the age—earnings profile
in a fashion identical to that used in estimating permanent income. In
addition to the retirement pension only the surviving spouses' pension,
for those over 45, was included in the calculation. In computing the flat—rate
components of social security wealth everyone of at least 65 years of age—14—
was assumed to receive OAS. No allowance for SPA was made because the age-
earnings profile implicitly assumes that spouses effectively work until
they are 65. Current and future eligibility for the GIS was determined
using the appropriate needs test.
In estimating the present value of private pension wealth, actual
receipts were used for retirees, and an expected pension was imputed for
those in pension plans who were below retirement age, (assumed to be 65).
The imputation, expressed in 1976 dollars, was based on a regression for
pension receipts of retirees in terms of permanent income, age and occupation.
To allow for sample selection bias the inverse Mills' ratio computed from
a probit model of positive pension receipts for retirees, was included as
an explanatory variable. The pension was adjusted by survival probabilities.
For the present value calculation it is necessary to make some assumption
about current and future pre—and post—retirement indexation. Indexation
provisions vary widely across pension plans and any assumption, (although
we do take notice of what evidence is available), applied uniformly across
households will only be an approximation. The heterogeneity of the pension
plans across occupations will be captured to some extent in the imputation
of pension receipts. We assume that prior to retirement, benefits are
effectively indexed to the rate of growth of wages and salaries. Therefore,
as was done for CQPP benefits,a discount factor of one is used for years
pre—retirement. Post—retirement we assume the level of indexation is 60%
of the CPI and also the rate of inflation to be 5%. This yields a discount
rate for post—retirement years of 4.5%. With the information available, it
was difficult to incorporate survivors' pensions. The procedure used assumes
that any living spouse will be entitled to one—half of the households' pension—15—
income, regardless of whether he or she is widowed.
A more detailed description of the Canadian retirement income system,
and of the construction of the wealth estimates is presented in
Dicks—Mireaux (1981 b). Mean values of wealth in these various forms in
the sample of 8,279 households were the following; for net worth recorded
in the survey $65,821, social security wealth $74,363, and for the
3,832 households with private pension wealth $61,349.
4. Robustness Analysis of Displacement Effects
We now turn to an analysis of the robustness of the estimated dis-
placement effects. The model of equation (3) augmented by additional
explanatory variables may be written as
in [-f]= Z1y1+ Z2y2 —lln[J —2D in {}+u (6)
where Z1 is an N x J matrix of J basic explanatory varibles for the N
households (listed in column 1 of Appendix 2) and l is the associated
parameter vector. Z2 is an N x K matrix of K "doubtful" variables (listed
in column 2 of Appendix 2) and the associated parameter vector. The
2
disturbances u are assumed to be distributed N(o,a I). To simplify




X is the N x (J + K +2) data matrix
is the (J + K + 2) x 1 parameter vector (y1,y2, l'—16—
Estimationof (6) yields consistent estimates of ,whichwe denote by
b, and of the sample data precision matrixH11. Given the normality of u,
the estimator 8 is asymptotically normally distributed and we shall assume
that our sample size (8,279) is sufficiently large that we may ignore
deviations from normality. Suppose also that we have a multivariate normal
priorfor 8 of b* with prior precision matrix H*. Then the location of the
posterior mean of 8 is given by the following matrix—weighted average of the
prior location and the regression estimator (Chamberlain and Learner 1976).
=(H+ H*) 1(Hb + Hb*) (8)
Clearly,if wehave specified both b* and H*, there is a unique posterior
meanand implied preferred estimates for the displacement effects. But it
is unlikely that we would be willing to specify fully a prior distribution
for 8. Nevertheless, even in this case, the posterior can be shown to lie
within a certain region, the size of which depends upon how fully the prior
distribution is specified.
The first case is where we know the sample estimates of 8, b, and the
sample precision matrix H.But, although we are willing to specify a
prior location for 8, b*, we wish the prior precision matrix to be completely
arbitrary. Then from Learner (1978, Theorem 5.11) we know that the posterior





Equation (9) defines a region within which the posterior mean is located
and can be used to provide extreme bounds on individual parameter values. Our—17—
interest, however, lies not in the whole ellipsoid but only in the restrictions
it implies on the posterior means of the displacement effects. This
natural two—dimensional feature of our study means that we can exploit an
appealing geometric representation of our results. Instead of computing
extreme bounds we mayplotthe projection of the ellipsoid given by (9)
into displacement effect space. This projection, in terms of the (a1 a2)
coefficient space, is an ellipse described by the following equation.
(a —c)'Z(a—c)=:(b—b*)'H(b—b*) (10)
where a is the vector (—a1, —a2), c the subvector of c corresponding to
the pension wealth variables, and Z is the matrix (R) the inverse of
the 2 x 2 submatrix formedbytaking the rows and columns of the inverse of
H corresponding to social security and private pension wealth. Using (4)
and (5) we may convert (10) into an ellipse for the displacement effects,
and we plot this ellipse for each of the three sets of prior beliefs
described in section 2.
Prior 1
The first type of prior information we examine is a belief about which
are the relevant explanatory variables. In section 2 we argued that these
included the variables in the Z1 matrix, in addition to the pension wealth
variables, with the doubtful variables in the Z2 matrix. Our prior for
is, therefore, the regression estimates for l' a1 and a2fromthe model with
Z2 excluded (which implies a prior for 2of zero))2 These estimates are
shown in column 1 of Table 1. The priors for the displacement effects
obtained from the restricted model are 0.171 for social security wealth—18—
(an extra dollar of social security wealth reduces household net worth by 17.1
cents) and 0.508 for private pension wealth. The regression estimates from
the augmented model (including all the doubtful variables) are shownin
column 2 of Table 1. They impiydisplacementeffects of 0.208 for social
security wealth and 0.276 for private pension wealth.
Using these estimates, we plotted the feasible ellipse corresponding to
the first prior and this is shown in displacement effect space in Figure 2.
The two sets of estimates are clearly close to each other, but, because they
are matrix—weighted averages, the posterior means do not necessarily lie
between the prior and the data points. This can be seen in Figure 2 in which
the feasible ellipse contains values outside the range between the prior and
regression estimates, particularly in the case of social security. The
extreme bounds on the displacement effects defined by the ellipse in Figure 2
are 0.107 to 0.273 for social security wealth and 0.272 to 0.512 for private
pension wealth.
We have interpreted the ellipse in Figure 2 as defining a feasible
region for posterior beliefs about the displacement effects given a set of
prior beliefs and a set of regression estimates for equation (6). An
alternative interpretation is that it represents the locus of displacement
effects implied by the regression estimates of (6) subject to linear con-
straints on the parameter vector of the form
R( —b*)=0 (11)—19—
Given constraint of this type (i.e., a matrix R), the estimate
of (6) subject to the constraint lies on the boundary of the ellipse shown
in Figure 2.13 When R =Iwe obtain the prior and when R =0we obtain the
regression estimate (shown as the point DATA on Figure 2).Different R
matrices trace out the ellipse and correspond to regression estimates for
differing linear combinations of explanatory variables. In this way, the
ellipse summarises the estimated displacement effects for a whole family
of regressions.
Prior 2
The second prior is that the displacement effects are zero. With this
prior the feasible ellipse for the posterior, means of the pension wealth
coefficients is given by
(—)'Z(c—) =k (12)
where a is the vector of regression estimates of and c2, and the
constant K can be determined by the condition that the ellipse must pass
through the prior and the data points. It is, therefore, unnecessary to
specify a prior for the other parameters of the model if we are projecting
the feasible ellipsoid into two dimensions. The feasible ellipse for the
second prior is shown in Figure 3 denoted by F. The bounds on the values
of the posterior means for the displacement effects are —0.034 to 0.244
for social security wealth and —0.064 to 0.340 for private pension wealth.
The introduction of prior information about the location of the parameters
widens the bounds for the displacement effects compared with the case when
prior beliefs concerned the set of explanatory variables.To narrow—20—
the range we need to know how much weight to place on the sample evidence
and how much on the prior information. The information about displacement
effects contained in the data may be summarized in the iso—likelihood
contours. In pension wealth space these data confidence ellipses are
defined by
(—a)'Z(a— =,,2 (13)
Similarly the iso—prior density contours lie on the ellipses
(cx— a*)'Z*(cz_ a*) =p2 (14)
where Z* is the matrix (II*l)s and a* is the prior vector for cz, and
For any given prior density we could ask the question "which parameter
values xnaximise the probability that they are consistent with the observed
data?". The answer is the locus of points of tangency between the prior
ellipses and the confidence ellipses, christened the Information contract
curve by Learner (1978). It Is defined by minimizing £ for a given value of
p, and in two—dimensions Is the following hyperbola
=(Z+ AZ*)(Za + AZ*a*) 0 A (15)
As A varies from zero to infinity we trace out the information contract
curve moving from the data point to the prior location. Given a prior
covariance matrix (which we need to specify only up to a scalar multiple)
the contract curve is defined. For the prior covariance matrix of displacement
effects we choose a block diagonal matrix with the subtnatrix corresponding—21—




Because private pension wealth, as measured here, probably has more
unobservable attributes than social security wealth, we take ourprior
standard error for the private pension wealth displacement effect to belarger
than that for social security wealth. In the calculations belowwe assume that
k =1.5.Beliefs about the magnitude of one of the displacement effects
are likely to be highly correlated with those about the others. For example,
it would be unlikely that many people would have a prior belief ofzero
for one effect and unity for the other. We take a value for the correlation
coefficient, r in (16), of 0.75. The contract curve is independent of
the value of the scalar a, but to calibrate the prior densityellipses
we take a prior standard error for the social security displacement effect
of 10 cents. In other words, for a given prior location theprior 95 per cent
confidence interval is equal to the location plus or minus 20 cents.
The contract curve, CC, corresponding to the prior location ofzero and
prior covariance matrix (16), is shown in Figure 3 together with the 95per cent
data confidence ellipse, D, and 95 per cent prior densityellipse, P. The
contract curve joins the prior location and the regression estimates)4
Although the two 95 per cent ellipses Intersect, the prior mean of zero is
not contained in the confidence ellipse for this data set. Figure 3 shows
that, in this case, the bounds on the displacement effects implied by the
contract curve are only a little tighter than those given by the feasible
ellipse. An alternative approach is to place a limit on the extent to which—22--
we wish to deviate from the estimates implied by the data. For example,
suppose that we consider only those values of the displacement effects
which lie within the 95 per cent data confidence ellipse, then the posterior
location must be in the intersection of the feasible ellipse and the 95 per
cent confidence ellipse. This is shown as the hatched area in Figure 3'.
Prior 3
The final prior we consider is that the displacement effect is unity
for both types of pension wealth. The feasible ellipse, the 95 per cent
prior density and data confidence ellipses, and the contract curve are all
plotted in Figure 4. With this prior the bounds on the displacement effects
implied by the feasible ellipse are rather uninformative; they are 0.143
to 1.066 for social security wealth and —0.032 to 1.308 for private pension
wealth. The data and the prior are well separated, and the 95 per cent
prior and confidence ellipses do not intersect. The contract curve provides
much tigher bounds than the feasible ellipse for the private pension wealth
displacement effect. Tighter bounds still are obtained by looking at the
intersection of the feasible ellipse and the 95 per cent confidence ellipse
(the hatched area in Figure 4), and, in effect, this gives much greater
weight to the data than to the prior. Alternatively, we might choose points
on the contract curve which attach a specific weight to the prior. For example,
if we wish to remain within the 95 per cent prior ellipse, then the point
which maximises the likelihood of the observations from our sample (the
intersection of the 95 per cent prior density ellipse and the contract curve)
is 0.728 for social security wealth and 0.633 for private pension wealth.—23--
Wemay summarize the role of prior information as follows. If we
specify only prior values for the displacement effects, we know that our
preferred (posterior) estimates lie in the feasible ellipse. This is shown
in Figures 2, 3 and 4 for the three sets of priors which we have examined.
If we are prepared to specify our relative prior uncertainty about the
displacement effects (equivalent to defining a prior covariance matrix up
to a scalar multiple) then we obtain the contract curve. A fully specified
set of prior standard errors leads to a unique point on the contract curve.
The uncertainty about the size of the displacement effects is summarised
in Table 2 which shows the bounds on the two effects arising from different
sources of uncertainty. First, we show the range of estimates resulting from
sampling uncertainty in terms of the upper and lower bounds of the 95 per
cent confidence interval for each effect. Secondly, we give the bounds
determined by the feasible ellipse. Finally, we show the bounds which
result from taking the intersection of the feasible ellipse and the 95 per
cent confidence ellipse. In the case of the first prior concerning the choice
of explanatory variables to be included in the model, sampling uncertainty
is far greater than specification uncertainty. For the second prior the
differences between the prior and data points result in uncertainty about
the displacement effects of the same order of magnitude as the sampleconfidence
interval. The overall picture is that the estimated displacement effects
are rather robust with respect to the specification of the model. Moreover,
ifwerestrict ourselves to estimates in the 95percent confidence ellipse,
differingprior beliefs about the magnitude of the displacement effects do-.24—
notlead to radically different posterior beliefs, particularly in the case
of social security. The evidence suggests that there is a small but
significant displacement effect of pension wealth on private saving.
We conclude with some caveats about the assumptions underlying our
methodology. The priors for the displacement effects were assumed tobe joint
normally distributed. With this assumption the posterior is a matrix—weighted
average of the prior and regression estimates.But prior beliefs may not
be symmetrically distributed around their mean. For example, if the prior mean
for the displacment effect is zero, we may not wish to attach equal
probabilities to the effect being positive as to it being negative.In
these circumstances an asymmetric prior distribution, such as the Beta
distribution, might be more appropriate. It is no simple matter, however,
to compute the convolutionof a normal and Beta distribution, andthe use
of matrix—weighted averages is very straightforward. The issue of the
appropriate prior distribution raises the question offull—scale Bayesian
estimation. If we specified a purpose for the estimated displacementeffects
then we could write down a loss function in terms of estimation errors and
use the appropriate estimator rather than a regression estimate.
5. Sensitivity of Displacement Estimates to the Measurement_of Pension Wealth
The accuracy with which pension wealth is measured will affect the
estimates of the displacement effects implied by the regression model of
household net worth. In this section we examine the sensitivity of our
estimates to alternative measures of pension wealth.—25—
We consider three potential sources of measurement error. Firstly,
there may be an error in the imputation of private pension benefits. In
section 3 it was assumed that before retirement these benefits are
indexed to wage and salary growth. This may not be true for several
reasons. One is that even final earnings plans have an earnings base
of several years which means that there may be substantial pre—retirement
erosion of benefits by inflation. Another is that wage growth may not be
exogenous, and the growth of pension benefits and wages may be inversely
related. Finally, even if benefits are vested immediately, firms do not
index pensions of terminated workers before retirement. The benefits
imputed to pre—retirement pension plan members are based on an econometric
model of the benefits received by current retirees, which predicts the
level of benefits in terms of several socio—economic characteristics of
the recipient. If one assumes that the nature of pension plans, including
the features mentioned above, remains unchanged then the model of benefit
levels captures these aspects. That is, given the structure of pension
plans and the characteristics of plan members, the model does in fact
impute the real value of the pension at age 65 that the recipient expects
to receive. Because of their statutory nature, it is likely that any
error in the construction of anticipated social security benefits will be
small.
The two remaining possible sources of error reside in our choice of
the real discount rate and the expected rate of inflation. Altering the
assumed value of the real discount rate will change the discount factor
used for both pre— and post—retirement years. Because social security—26--
is fully indexed, different values of the expected inflation rate will
change only the discount factor for private pension wealth. In Table 3
the displacement effects based on regression estimates of the augmented
model (given in column 2 of Table 1), are shown for different
assumptions about the real discount and expected inflation rates. The
first row, "Standard Assumptions," corresponds to the data point in
Figure 2. Rows 2 and 3 show the effect of lowering or increasing the real
discount rate given the "standard" expected inflation rate. Similarly,
rows 4 and 5 show the consequence of alternative expected inflation rates
given the "standard" real discount rate. These alternative assumptions
lead to only small changes in the displacement effect for social security
wealth. For private pension wealth this is true also of the different
expected inflation rates, but not of the real discount rate. At a real
discount rate of 4 per cent per annum, the estimated displacement effect
is small and negative, although insignificantly different from zero. With
this exception the estimated effects seem rather robust to deviations from
the standard assumptions. Since the effect of these alternative
assumptions on the structure of the relevant subinatrix of the sample
covariance matrix was also found to be minor, the analysis of section 4
appears also to be robust with respect to the construction of the data.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have shown how estimates of the displacement effect
of pension wealth on household net worth are affected by prior beliefs of
different types. The estimated effects are robust with respect to the
specification of the model, and, even for very different prior beliefs—27—
about the magnitude of the displacement effects, the posterior means
suggest a small but significant impact of pension wealth on private
saving. We have also shown that if there are two parameters of principal
interest, then the results can all be presented succintly in a diagram.
This allows the reader to observe the complete set of results rather than
a table of a subset of points selected by the investigator. The projection
of the ellipsoids (feasible, prior, and confidence) into two dimensions
is simple to calculate and requires only six numbers, the priors for the
two parameters, and the four elements of the appropriate submatrix of the
prior precision matrix in addition to the regression estimates. For this
reason we hope that the geometrical approach used here may have a wider
application.Appendix 1: Age Variables Employed in the Study
We define
household


















= 1if A. <30,zero
1
=1if 30 A <40,
=1if 40A. <50, 1
=1if 50A <60, 1
























d3(A -40)2+ 100 d i i
j=4ji
6








15d61ppendix 1: Age Variables (continued)
V6i =d51(Ai—60)2+ 225d61
V7 =d6Appendix 2: Variables Used in the Study
Basic Variables Doubtful Variables
1. Constant 1. V12
2. V1 2. V22
3. V2 3. V32
4. V3 4. V42
5. V4 5. DIFF =Ageof head of house-




7. REG 1; dummy equals 1 if region
8. V7 of household in Quebec,
zero otherwise*
9. mY
8. REG 2; dummy equals 1 if region
10. Number of Persons with Life of household is Ontario,
Insurance Prairies or British
Columbia, zero otherwise*
11. in
9. AREA; dummy equals 1 if area
12. ln (y) ofhousehold is rural,
zero otherwise**
13. Inverse of Mills' ratio
10. Farm Family Dummy
11. Number of Persons Unemployed
12. Number of Adults in Household
*Thedefault region is Atlantic.
**Thedefault areas are large and small urban areas.FOOTNOTES
This study was prepared f or the NBER/SSRC Conference on Microdata and
Public Economics, Oxford, June 1982, and was funded by NSF grant no.
SES 7914209 and the SSRC Programme Grant HR 4652 on Taxation, Incentives,
and the Distribution of Income. Neither the NSF, SSRC, nor NBER are
responsible for the views expressed in the paper. We are grateful to
A.B. Atkinson, R. Blundell, J. Hausman, S.M. Kanbur, and N.H. Stern for
helpful comments, and to D. Reitman for help with the computation of the
pension wealth series. They should not be held responsible for any
errors that remain.
brief survey of the US literature may be found in Danziger, Haveman,
and Plotnick (1981); for a more comprehensive survey see Dick—Mireaux
(1981a).
2Funding of social security does not require a separate fund into which
contributions are paid. Rather it refers to whether the benefits paid
out could have been financed from the contributions and accumulated
income.
3Another problem with this approach is the lack of an obvious criterion
for the process of model selection. In contrast with time—series data
where tests of dynamic misspecification may be used to generate the
most parsimonious representation consistent with white noise error, cross—
section data offer no such clear choice. In the former case it is
conventional to assume a small and given number of exogenous variables
and achieve parsimony by reducing the number of lags required to model
the data generation process. With cross—section data there is no such
natural ordering of variables.
4For further discussion of this point see King and Dicks—Mireaux (1982).
51n the case of certainty, and for particular assumptions about the
utility function of households, the function relating net worth to age
Is very tightly parameterised and is determined by the optimal consumption
plan (Blinder et al, 1980). But with uncertainty it is possible to
obtain an explicit function for net worth only in special cases.
6The "hump—shaped" profile holds also for the behaviour of net worth
excluding pension wealth.
7A farm family is one in which any member receives more than 50 per cent
of his income from self—employment In farming. Such a variable is
Important in a country like Canada where farms are substantial and asset
valuation problems particularly severe.
8These do not, however, represent the extremes of feasible values.
A negative displacement effect is possible if pension wealth alerts
people to the need to save for retirement (Cagan 1965, Katona 1965).
A displacement effect in excess of unity could occur if the introduction
of an unfunded pension scheme were announced well in advance.9All computations on this data base were carried out by the authors and
should not be attributed to Statistics Canada. Further details of the
data may be found in Statistics Canada (1979).
1-°Also excluded were 139 "special family units," primarily those with high
incomes, for whom data on age and other characteristics were notrecorded
on the tape to protect their identity. These familiesaccounted for 7.3
per cent of the total value of assets held by the completesample (using
population weights to compute the share).
11These are derived from the two—step procedure described in section 3
with the corrected covariance matrix for such an estimator (Greene 1981).
'2Foran application of the "doubtful variables" approach to other
empirical problems see NcManus (1980) and Cooley and Le Roy (1981).
'3Toshowthis, simply substitute the expression for a constrained
least—squaresestimate into equation (9) defining the ellipse; see
Learner (1978, Theorem 5.1).
-4Points on the contract curve need not, in general, lie between the
prior and regression estimates because ct, as defined by (15),is a
matrix—weighted average of the two estimates. The ellipse shown in
Figure 3 is the hull of all possible contract curves fordifferent
choices of Z*.TABLE 1. NET WORTH REGRESSIONS: TRUNCATED SAMPLE W $2500
(standard errors in parentheses*)
W


















in Y —0.501 —0.595
(0.067) (0.094)
Number of Persons with 0.036 0.065
Life Insurance (0.015) (0.014)
Social Security Wealth —0.192 —0.234
in
(0.058) (0.083)
































*These are the corrected asymptotic standard errors appropriate for a
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8266TABLE 2:BOUNDSON DISPLACEMENT EFFECTS
SOCIALSECURITY WEALTH PRIVATE PENSION WEALTH
LOWER UPPER DIFFERENCE LOWER UPPER DIFFERENCE
1. Sampling Uncertainty .064 .352 .288 .067 .485 .418
(data pointl.96a)
2. Posterior Means
Prior 1 0.107 0.273 0.166 0.272 0.512 0.240
Prior 2 —0.034 0.244 0.278 —0.064 0.340 0.404
Prior 3 0.143 1.066 1.209 —0.032 1.308 1.340
3. Intersection of 95%
Confidence and
Feasible Ellipses
Prior 1 0.107 0.273 0.166 0.272 0.512 0.240
Prior 2 0.008 0.244 0.236 —0.013 0.340 0.353
Prior 3 0.147 0.566 0.419 0.079 0.408 0.329
Source: Own Calculations.TABLE 3: DISPLACEMENT EFFECTS FOR ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF PENSION WEALTH
(standard errors in parentheses*)
Assumptions
Real Expected Rate
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